|
Given the dynamics driving the instability isnt stationary and central bank measures often take a long time to filter through (obviousy example being raising rates yet continuation of property speculation) more time needs to be spent on what policy might induce counterbalancing feedback. Not only does it make one think about the worlds inherent instability, for which no obvious solution exists, it reminds us that we need to work on policy that tries to generate negative feedback to counteract the positive feedback to take us from hedge finance, to speculative finance, to ponzi finance. Minsky explores a form of instability that is not discussed in most growth models, he discusses the instability that is embedded in our economies resulting from the use of currency its fluctuation from being scarce to abundant. After reading Minsky one can read policy recommendations and get a more complete sense of the influence and the merit in things like bank capital cushions being used to dampen multiyear volatility. Minsky has identified a particularly dangerous form of the animal spirits that Keynes and more recently Schiller have written about, especially in a fiat currency environment in which we are separated from the pricing of money mechanism that the central bank is empowered to control. This is and has really re-emerged as a classic and prophetic book on the endogenous factors that drive instability.
The "trajectory" of an economy is usually smooth and the stochastic growth drivers/detractors are technology and exogenous shocks, where exogenous are not known from a substance or timing perspective a priori. After reading this book, one is not an expert able to give a solution to endogenous money and asset price shock risks, but one can understand the problem much more deeply. Again, the book is referred to a little too late and undoubtedly the same will happen in whatever next bubble next pops. This book is worth reading for a multitude of reasons. This has always been a must read, but the recent and ongoing crisis is another re-affirmation to add this to ones cart. To give a quick overview, most people study economic growth as as function of the economy's factors of production (including human capital) and their dynamics (modern economists are updating methods and ideas but people are still taught the solow growth model as foundational).
To me his insights as to the dynamics of what drives asset bubbles, in particular, banks propensity to lend as well as agents propensity to borrow against assets as a function of recent history was so spot on it makes you smile were it not so sad that it just happened.
This material should find its way into Introductory Macroeconomics textbooks to replace all the right wing trash. A lot of ground is covered and important points are repeated so understanding of the material is more easily retained. Read this book and you will see for yourself. I just finished reading this book and I have to say that my understanding of the crisis and in the general workings of the economy are vastly improved. The math isn't too hard and Minsky's prose is pretty good.
Be warned: Minsky often throws in long chains of causality that a layperson probably would not truely grasp. He also sharply criticizes Hicks and Patinkin for 'bastardizing' Keynes. In an age of neoliberalism I highly doubt too many politicians would campaign for a new CCC or WPA. Whether it was from some serious flaw in his theory that I'm ignorant of or if it was merely political (Minsky is not afraid to point the blame at Monetarists and Reagan).
"The fundamental propositions of the financial instability hypothesis are:1. I recently finished a course in intermediate macroeconomics, basically teaching only the neoclassical theory, and sections 3&4 were still difficult. Let alone the socialization of key capital intensive industries. Capitalist market mechanism cannot lead to a sustained, stable-price, full-employment equilibrium.2.
However, Minsky's solutions in section 5 would be considered highly controversial today. This is by no means a passive book.Hopefully the next generation of economists may learn from the current crisis, with the help of men like Minsky, and successfully stabilize an unstable economy. Serious business cycles are due to financial attributes that are essential to capitalism"Minsky includes a good overview of the neoclassical synthesis and how the Walrasian 'village fair' economy is incompatible with Keynes' General Theory. Minsky's assertions sound so convincing I'm struck wondering why he was ignored.
A full-employment economy is bound to expand, whereas an economy that aims at accelerating growth through devices that induce capital-intensive private investment not only may not grow, but may be increasingly inequitable in its income distribution, inefficient in its choices of techniques and unstable in its overall performance." But, as Minsky acknowledges, capitalism cannot deliver full employment: "Capitalist market mechanisms cannot lead to a sustained, stable-price, full-employment equilibrium."He proposes, "Public control, if not out-and-out public ownership, of large-scale capital-intensive production units is essential." He suggests nationalising the railroads and the nuclear power industry, as private enterprise runs both so poorly. The dynamics of a capitalist economy which has complex, sophisticated, and evolving financial structures leads to the development of conditions conducive to incoherence - to runaway inflations or deep depressions." Strangely, capitalism can't handle capital: "capitalism is flawed precisely because it cannot readily assimilate productive processes that use large-scale capital assets."What is to be done. What causes these recessions. He also notes capitalism's other failures: "the market mechanism. This instability is not due to external shocks or to the incompetence or ignorance of policy makers. This classic work of political economy, first published in 1986, has valuable lessons for us today.
financially complex capitalism is inherently flawed." Yet he believes, "the collapse of aggregate demand and profits, such as occasionally occurred and often threatened to occur in pre-1933 small government capitalism, is never a clear and present danger in a Big Government capitalism such as has ruled since World War Two." Life is disproving this hope. He warns, "Meaningful reforms cannot be put over by an advisory and administrative elite that is itself the architect of the existing situation." Then he stresses, "The emphasis on investment and `economic growth' rather than on employment as a policy objective is a mistake. Minsky studies the recessions of 1975 and 1982, economic theory, institutions, particularly banks, and finally presents an agenda for reform.Financial traumas have led to ever-worse recessions, in 1970, 1975, 1979-80, 1982, 1987, 2002 and the present. Instability is due to the internal processes of our type of economy. cannot and should not be relied upon for important, big matters such as the distribution of income, the maintenance of economic stability, the capital development of the economy, and the education and training of the young." It seems we can't rely on capitalism for anything. As he notes, "the normal functioning of our economy leads to financial trauma and crises, inflation, currency depreciations, unemployment, and poverty in the midst of what could be virtually universal affluence - in short,.
Minsky writes, "the Wall Streets of the world are important; they generate destabilizing forces.
The tendency to throw fundamentals to the wind and bet the farm on a bull run is without question a fundamental in and of itself. Humans can also modify their behavior. Instability is obvious to anyone who has been involved with commodities. Minsky has done the work outlining the reality of capitalistic systems. Minsky has outlined the new economic order that universities should embrace and teach our future generations. This is how our economy really works. Intuitively I knew his points as he made them. Booms and busts are the result of natural human tendencies but are not the preferred nor inevitable outcomes.
|
